| dc.creator |
Robinson, E. J. Z. |
|
| dc.creator |
Albers, H. J. |
|
| dc.creator |
Lokina, Razack B. |
|
| dc.creator |
Meshack, C. |
|
| dc.date |
2016-03-24T13:34:58Z |
|
| dc.date |
2016-03-24T13:34:58Z |
|
| dc.date |
2013 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2018-03-27T09:04:51Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2018-03-27T09:04:51Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
Robinson, E.J., Albers, H.J., Meshack, C. and Lokina, R.B., 2013, August. Implementing REDD through community‐based forest management: Lessons from Tanzania. In Natural Resources Forum (Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 141-152). |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1376 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/4560 |
|
| dc.description |
REDD (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) aims to slow carbon
releases caused by forest disturbance by making payments conditional on forest quality over
time. Like earlier policies to slow deforestation, REDD must change the behaviour of forest
degraders. Broadly, it can be implemented with payments to potential forest degraders, thus
creating incentives; through payments for enforcement, thus creating disincentives; or through
addressing external drivers such as urban charcoal demand. In Tanzania, community-based
forest management (CBFM), a form of participatory forest management (PFM), was chosen as
the model for implementing REDD pilot programs. Payments are made to villages that have the
rights to forest carbon. In exchange for these payments, the villages must demonstrably reduce
deforestation at the village level. Using this pilot program as a case study, we provide insights
for REDD implementation in sub-Saharan Africa. We pay particular attention to leakage,
monitoring and enforcement. We suggest that implementing REDD through CBFM-type
structures can create appropriate incentives and behavioural change when the recipients of the
REDD funds are also the key drivers of forest change. When external forces drive forest
change, however, REDD through CBFM-type structures becomes an enforcement program,
with local communities rather than government agencies being responsible for the enforcement.
That structure imposes costs on local communities, whose local authority limits the ability to
address leakage outside the particular REDD village. In addition, for REDD to lead to lower
emissions, implementation will have to emphasize conditionality of payments on measurable
decreases in forest loss. |
|
| dc.language |
en |
|
| dc.publisher |
Natural Resource Forum, A United Nations Sustainable Development Journal |
|
| dc.subject |
REDD |
|
| dc.subject |
community-based forest management |
|
| dc.subject |
leakage |
|
| dc.subject |
Tanzania |
|
| dc.title |
Implementing REDD through Community-Based Forest Management: Lessons from Tanzania |
|
| dc.type |
Journal Article |
|