Journal ArticlePrevious studies on the agency model of the firm extensively recognize the managerial ownership and external debt as important tools in mitigating agency conflicts and enhancing firm value. They also find that increase in the external monitors, for example the institutional investors, can actually play a useful role in limiting agency problems in the firm. This paper, using 1351 companies from UK between 2004 and 2008 explores the impact of institutional holdings on managerial ownership and debt policy in an integrated framework by using a simultaneous equations estimation procedure (2SLS). The findings show that there is a significant negative relationship between institutional ownership and corporate leverage. This escalates the agency costs of debt because debt holders increase the rate of borrowing when they realize that institutional ownership increases in such a way as to jeopardize their wealth because using the control power they accumulate from their ownership, institutional shareholders may engage in riskier projects.In addition, corporate leverage is also governed by managerial ownership and revealed a statistically significant negative relationship. At the same time, debt appears as a key governance variable as it moderates private benefits extraction from corporate free cash flows as reported in the results of this paper that companies with higher average debt ratios accumulate less free cash flows as opposed to companies with lower average debt ratios.