Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: An example from Tanzania

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dc.creatorRobinson, E. J. Z.
dc.creatorAlbers, H. J.
dc.creatorNgeleza, G.
dc.creatorLokina, Razack B.
dc.date2016-03-24T13:34:44Z
dc.date2016-03-24T13:34:44Z
dc.date2014
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-27T09:04:50Z
dc.date.available2018-03-27T09:04:50Z
dc.descriptionTypically both local villagers (―insiders‖) and non-locals (―outsiders‖) extract products from protected forests even though the activities are illegal. Our paper suggests that, depending on the relative ecological damage caused by each group, budget-constrained forest managers may be able to reduce total forest degradation by legalizing ―insider‖ extraction in return for local villagers involvement in enforcement activities. We illustrate this through the development of a game-theoretic model that considers explicitly the interaction between the forest manager who can combine a limited enforcement budget with legalization of insider resource extraction and livelihood projects such as bee keeping, insider villagers, and outsider charcoal producers.
dc.identifierRobinson, E.J., Albers, H.J., Ngeleza, G. and Lokina, R.B., 2014. Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: An example from Tanzania. Ecological Economics, 107, pp.242-248.
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1373
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/4556
dc.languageen
dc.publisherEcological Economics
dc.subjectparticipatory forest management
dc.subjectlocal enforcement
dc.subjectTanzania
dc.subjectcharcoal production
dc.subjectnon-timber forest products
dc.subjectbee keeping
dc.titleInsiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: An example from Tanzania
dc.typeJournal Article

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