Efficiency enforcement and Revenue trade-offs in Participatory Forest Management: An Example from Tanzania

Simple item page
dc.creatorRobinson, E. J. Z.
dc.creatorLokina, Razack B.
dc.date2016-03-24T13:32:02Z
dc.date2016-03-24T13:32:02Z
dc.date2012
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-27T09:04:52Z
dc.date.available2018-03-27T09:04:52Z
dc.descriptionWhere joint forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, ‘volunteer’ patrollers take responsibility for enforcing restrictions over the harvesting of forest resources, often receiving as an incentive a share of the collected fine revenue. Using an optimal enforcement model, we explore how that share, and whether villagers have alternative sources of forest products, determines the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe rather than honestly reporting the illegal collection of forest resources. Without funds for paying and monitoring patrollers, policy makers face tradeoffs over illegal extraction, forest protection and revenue generation through fine collection
dc.identifierRobinson, E.J. and Lokina, R.B., 2012. Efficiency, enforcement and revenue tradeoffs in participatory forest management: an example from Tanzania. Environment and Development Economics, 17(01), pp.1-20.
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1355
dc.identifier10.1017/S1355770X11000209
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/4567
dc.languageen
dc.publisherEnvironment and Development Economics
dc.subjectEfficiency
dc.subjectenforcement
dc.subjectrevenue tradeoffs
dc.subjectParticipatory Forest Management
dc.subjectTanzania
dc.titleEfficiency enforcement and Revenue trade-offs in Participatory Forest Management: An Example from Tanzania
dc.typeJournal Article

Files

Collections

Department of Economics